Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Sex, Lies and Oil Spills



Robert F. Kennedy Jr.

Robert F. Kennedy Jr.

Posted: May 5, 2010 10:19 AM





(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-f-kennedy-jr/sex-lies-and-oil-spills_b_564163.html)

A common spin in the right wing coverage of BP's oil spill is a gleeful suggestion that the gulf blowout is Obama's Katrina.
In truth, culpability for the disaster can more accurately be laid at the Bush Administration's doorstep. For eight years, George Bush's presidency infected the oil industry's oversight agency, the Minerals Management Service, with a septic culture of corruption from which it has yet to recover. Oil patch alumnae in the White House encouraged agency personnel to engineer weakened safeguards that directly contributed to the gulf catastrophe.
The absence of an acoustical regulator -- a remotely triggered dead man's switch that might have closed off BP's gushing pipe at its sea floor wellhead when the manual switch failed (the fire and explosion on the drilling platform may have prevented the dying workers from pushing the button) -- was directly attributable to industry pandering by the Bush team. Acoustic switches are required by law for all offshore rigs off Brazil and in Norway's North Sea operations. BP uses the device voluntarily in Britain's North Sea and elsewhere in the world as do other big players like Holland's Shell and France's Total. In 2000, the Minerals Management Service while weighing a comprehensive rulemaking for drilling safety, deemed the acoustic mechanism "essential" and proposed to mandate the mechanism on all gulf rigs.
Then, between January and March of 2001, incoming Vice President Dick Cheney conducted secret meetings with over 100 oil industry officials allowing them to draft a wish list of industry demands to be implemented by the oil friendly administration. Cheney also used that time to re-staff the Minerals Management Service with oil industry toadies including a cabal of his Wyoming carbon cronies. In 2003, newly reconstituted Minerals Management Service genuflected to the oil cartel by recommending the removal of the proposed requirement for acoustic switches. The Minerals Management Service's 2003 study concluded that "acoustic systems are not recommended because they tend to be very costly."
The acoustic trigger costs about $500,000. Estimated costs of the oil spill to Gulf Coast residents are now upward of $14 billion to gulf state communities. Bush's 2005 energy bill officially dropped the requirement for the acoustic switch off devices explaining that the industry's existing practices are "failsafe."
Bending over for Big Oil became the ideological posture of the Bush White House, and, under Cheney's cruel whip, the practice trickled down through the regulatory bureaucracy. The Minerals Management Service -- the poster child for "agency capture phenomena" -- hopped into bed with the regulated industry -- literally. A 2009 investigation of the Minerals Management Service found that agency officials "frequently consumed alcohol at industry functions, had used cocaine and marijuana and had sexual relationships with oil and gas company representatives." Three reports by the Inspector General describe an open bazaar of payoffs, bribes and kickbacks spiced with scenes of female employees providing sexual favors to industry big wigs who in turn rewarded government workers with illegal contracts. In one incident reported by the Inspector General, agency employees got so drunk at a Shell sponsored golf event that they could not drive home and had to sleep in hotel rooms paid for by Shell.
Pervasive intercourse also characterized their financial relations. Industry lobbyists underwrote lavish parties and showered agency employees with illegal gifts, and lucrative personal contracts and treated them to regular golf, ski, and paintball outings, trips to rock concerts and professional sports events. The Inspector General characterized this orgy of wheeling and dealing as "a culture of ethical failure" that cost taxpayers millions in royalty fees and produced reams of bad science to justify unregulated deep water drilling in the gulf.

It is charitable to characterize the ethics of these government officials as "elastic." They seemed not to have existed at all. The Inspector General reported with some astonishment that Bush's crew at the MMS, when confronted with the laundry list of bribery, public theft and sexual and financial favors to and from industry "showed no remorse."
BP's confidence in lax government oversight by a badly compromised agency still staffed with Bush era holdovers may have prompted the company to take two other dangerous shortcuts. First, BP failed to install a deep hole shut off valve -- another fail-safe that might have averted the spill. And second, BP's reported willingness to violate the law by drilling to depths of 22,000-25,000 feet instead of the 18,000 feet maximum depth allowed by its permit may have contributed to this catastrophe.
And wherever there's a national tragedy involving oil, Cheney's offshore company Halliburton is never far afield. In fact, stay tuned; Halliburton may emerge as the primary villain in this caper. The blow out occurred shortly after Halliburton completed an operation to reinforce drilling hole casing with concrete slurry. This is a sensitive process that, according to government experts, can trigger catastrophic blowouts if not performed attentively. According to the Minerals Management Service, 18 of 39 blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico since 1996 were attributed to poor workmanship injecting cement around the metal pipe. Halliburton is currently under investigation by the Australian government for a massive blowout in the Timor Sea in 2005 caused by its faulty application of concrete casing.
The Obama administration has assigned nearly 2,000 federal personnel from the Coast Guard, the Corps of Engineers, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, EPA, NOAA and Department of Interior to deal with the spill -- an impressive response. Still, the current White House is not without fault -- the government should, for example, be requiring a far greater deployment of absorbent booms. But the real culprit in this villainy is a negligent industry, the festering ethics of the Bush Administration and poor oversight by an agency corrupted by eight years of grotesque subservience to Big Oil.

Tuesday, February 1, 2011

The Physics of Impossibility – a critical review of BP's & Oil Commission's blowout investigation reports.

- by BK Lim
Distorted facts, half truths and omissions do tell a story by themselves; especially when they occur so coherently across supposedly independent investigation reports. This article will not delve into the objectives or detailed analyses of these discrepancies found in these reports. A book had already been compiled on them waiting for publication.
This succinct outline of discrepancies illustrates the physics of impossibility if the analyses and conclusions of these official investigation reports are to be trusted, even partially
Why did the investigations ignore so many obvious impossibilities? Stripped bare of technological jargon, it is blatantly clear even to the layman, the disastrous blowout at Macondo MC252 could not have happened as reported and analysed by BP or the Oil Spill Commission, not unless the laws of universal nature (laws of physics) are revised to accommodate the erroneous conclusions contained therein. In general, both reports are long on technical intricacies but short on the fundamental issues that mattered.
Were 3 wells or 1 well drilled? 2.5 months (76 days) is a long time to spend on a single exploration well which normally takes from 2 weeks to 3 weeks to drill. Exploration wells are normally budget for 2 3 weeks actual drilling with another 1 to 2 weeks for testing a strike well. 11 weeks excluding the 4 weeks spent on in October – November 2009, was definitely excessive by any exploration standard. What happened in the 11 weeks and why were the reports “loudly” silent in this critical area of investigation?
Were the persistent rumours of 2 or even 3 wells examined in earnest especially in the face of the unexplained documented lies by BP officials at site that the Deepwater Horizon rig (DWH) had drifted 719ft NW in calm weather with 0.69 ft/s (0.05 knots) current? See conclusive evidence: Well A is not the well that blew up on 20 April
Did the blown well deviated (by-passed) or drilled vertically through the troublesome gas formation at around 13,000 ft BML? If indeed the blown well was deviated (as reported in the Well Activity Report) should this not be examined closely for possible direct causes of the blowout? Why was this issue omitted in both investigations? If there was no deviation and the blown well was drilled vertically (as shown in both reports) then BP would not have possibly drilled only one well in the absence of the phenonemal “Physics Of The Impossible”. Were legal improprieties and even criminality involved in drilling these additional wells with blatant disregard of authorized exploration procedures?
Even the promulgated official findings of the blowout itself failed high school physics. For the initial gas influx to enter from the bottom of the well, the pressure of the influx had to be higher than the pressure exerted by the total column of mud, salt water and spacer within the well. With the gas volume expanding inversely proportionally with decreasing pressure, any gas influx from the bottom of the well would have quickly developed into an uncontrollable oil gusher. If the rising gas bubble were to travel even 1/10th the speed of sound (330 m/s) it would have taken less than 25 seconds from the bottom of the well at 23,000 ft BSL (below sea level) to reach the floor of the drilling rig. For comparison, at the speed of 5 knots, the time taken to travel that distance is only 5.2 minutes.
Thus for BP's investigation report to conclude that the flow indications started approximately 51 minutes before the blowout occurred, it is equivalent to saying the gas influx “took a very slow train to China”. It simply could not have happened. Even ROVs ascend faster than 0.5 knots.
See Figure 143-1: BP investigation report page 79.
In any case, an oil gush from an open reservoir will continue until depletion as we saw in the 86 days before the well was capped. Just like any pent up coke bottle, once the bottle is popped the gas will flow until depletion without a second explosion. So how could the second explosion have happened?
The second and bigger blowout (explosion) on 22nd April 2010 could only have happened if and only if, the initial gas influx that caused fire to break out onboard DWH on 20 April, were to leak in through the shallow part of the well. The abnormal pressure readings observed during the negative tests and in the 52 minutes prior to the blowout, could be easily explained by a leaky top well section with hydraulic connection to vast amount of drilling mud and cement that had earlier infiltrated into the gas saturated week sub formation (GWSF) zone.
This would have meant that the well bore annuli of all 3 wells drilled were never properly sealed (cemented) to prevent hydraulic connection right up to the seabed. There are ample evidences to support the heavy drilling losses encountered in the drilling. In my previous blowout investigations, this would be the very first area to check for the causes of the blowout. What more when the dangers of gas hydrates in the deep waters of the gulf had already been forewarned. See MMS warned in 2009 about deepwater gas-blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico
A sixty-page memorandum addressed to Renee Orr, the chief of the leasing division of the Minerals Management Service (MMS), was sent in September 2009 by an environmental investigator, warning of potential disaster in offshore drilling operations and the particular dangers posed by gas hydrates.
Reports by MMS, a branch of the Interior Department, also provide evidence of the role bad cement work has played in accidents. One study named cementing as a factor in 18 of 39 well blowouts at Gulf rigs from 1992 to 2006. Another attributed five of nine out-of-control wells in the year 2000 to cementing problems.
Although bad cementing was discussed, both reports failed to recognise the fact that a poorly sealed top section of the well would have easily explained the abnormal pressure readings during the negative testing without having to invoke the illogical unscientific “Bladder Effect”. But admitting a badly sealed hydraulically connected top section would mean willful negligence since drilling could not have proceeded deeper if tests had shown top hole defects. Is that why this top hole issue was not discussed?
Most important of all, the initial gas influx from the base of the well could not explain the two broken drill pipes stuck in the riser phenomenon. BP tried to explain it frivolously that a weak sea current (0.69ft/s) could have drifted DWH and lifted the drill pipe by 25ft.
How could a fixed length riser (drifted or stationary) caused another fixed length drill pipe within it, to move vertically (differentially) by 25 ft? Even if DWH were to sink by 25ft (to compensate for the lateral movement) there would still be no differential movement of the drill pipe within the riser; unless the riser shrunk independently in length. In which case, the top drive (attached to the drill pipe) would have pushed the drill pipe downwards into the well and not vertically upwards (as observed when the top drive fell approx 26ft onto the rig floor).
It is only logical that the drill pipe was forced upwards (vertically), sheared and broke at the weakest point above joint A. What could have caused this tremendous upward force? Again the logical answer was the 2nd and more powerful blowout on the morning of 22nd April 2010 from the base of the well. Gas alone would not be sufficient since gas is compressible. While the initial gas influx and gas feed was from the GWSF zone (at much lower pressure), the second blowout occurred when the Shoe Track Cement and Float Collar gave way. Unlike gas, oil exploding out of the reservoir at very high pressure (13,000 psi) is not compressible. The hollow drill-pipe filled with high pressure hydraulic fluid (just like a “piston system”) would shoot like a high speed projectile upwards. It is doubtful the BOP and wellhead could even stand this tremendous pressure at the mudline. So was the late Matt Simmons right again that the BOP and wellhead were blown off or badly damaged? It does appear that the late Matt Simmons was not so senile after all.
No doubt the experts at BP and Oil Commission investigation team would have arrived at the same logical findings given in this article. This begs the obvious question; Why did they overlook the logical explanations in preference for absurdities?
Below is an expanding list (updated 1 Feb 2011) of impossibilities, omissions and questions which had not been addressed or wrongly concluded by BP's and the Oil Commission’s reports:
1 Impossible for 2 drill pipes to be embedded side by side in Riser from 1st blowout on 20 April 2010
2 Impossible for BP to have drilled at only at one well location
3 Impossible for well A to be the well that blew on 20 April 2010
4 Impossible for DWH to have drifted 719ft NW of original well A location
BP officials could not have determined to 1 ft accuracy the surface location of DWH. That location was calculated from coordinates. But even the Rovs could not be close enough to the burning rig to get a close fix. That location was obtained from the Rov sent down to manually shut down the BOP. It is therefore the seabed location of the blown well-head before the 2nd explosion.
5 Impossible for Well A to be the seabed origin of DWH & riser wreckage pattern
6 Impossible for the oil gush to flow from north to South when well A is south of gushing crater.
7 Why was the first ROV footage of the gushing well at seabed level >700ft NW of well A?
8 Why was the wellhead at Well A not shown to the public before mid June 2010?
9 Why was the bop dismantled and reassembled so many times before it was officially removed?
BP had consistently maintained that the BOP was fixed on well A wellhead since the day of the blowout on 20 April 2010. BP had also maintained that removing the BOP would have undesirable consequences. Thus the riser was left in place leaking and gush oil & gas at 3 locations when the most logical solution to the containment effort would be to cut the riser or even remove the damaged BOP and contain the gushing oil at the blown well itself. BP could not do that because it would have exposed BP's criminality in the disaster.
The BOP was officially removed in late September 2010 after the well was supposedly killed.
From insiders' sources this is a total fabrication. Rov footage showed the removal, dismantling and reassembling of the BOP, sightings of the BOP at locations other than well A location, etc; confirm that the gushing well could have been contained instead of being allowed to gush for more than 87 days. In reality the 2nd more powerful blowout damaged the wellhead and blown off the BOP. BP's “dog and pony show” at well A was to keep the world mesmerized with the predominantly gas gush at well A while they covertly tried to kill the real open gusher, S20BC, which is 720 ft NW of well A.
10 It is impossible to have 2 wellheads if only one well location was drilled.
There is concrete evidence of 2 distinct wellheads, one at Well B and the other at Well A. The wellhead at S20BC had been blown off together with the BOP.
11 Omission: well deviation
On the well activity reports and emails, it was clearly stated that BP applied to abandon the well after hitting an out-of-well control situation at 13,100 ft BML (below mudline) in early March 2010. In a WAR, the supposedly well A (but Well B in reality) was reported to have severed drill pipe at 12,100 ft BML and shut in the well. If the well had been side tracked (or bypassed) to avoid the gas strata should this interval not be examined for possible causes to the blowout? Why was this critical area bypassed in the investigation?
In reality, BP did not bypass or sidetrack from Well B. Instead they drilled a vertical well (see figure 143-2) at a 3rd location (S20BC) which blew up on 20 April 2010 720 ft NW of well A. Why did both reports not discuss this important issue? A deviated well would have been presented as shown in figure 143-3.

12 Reported by-pass / deviation impossible to execute
13 Impossible for gas influx that caused the fire on DWH on 20 April to come from bottom of well.
14 Unimaginable for the gas influx to enter the well undetected for >50 minutes before the 1st blowout.
15 Omission: 2nd underwater blowout (explosion) on 22 April which brought down the DWH
16 Impossible to know the 2nd underwater explosion occurred without ROV observation
This means that Rov footage of the 2nd blowout has been recorded by BP. Why has this video footage been kept from public view? This would easily confirm the late Matt Simmons' assertion that the BOP had been blown off in the 2nd blowout on 22nd April, 2 days after the first blowout.
17 Impossible for 2nd explosion to occur if 1st blowout was from gas influx at bottom of well.
18 Impossible to explain “bladder effect” without shallow well leakage & hydraulic connection with GWSF formation.
19 Impossible for drill pipe to break and be embedded in Riser from 1st blowout
See diagrammatic illustrations in figure 143-4 (at the top).

Friday, January 28, 2011

Shifting Procedures Upset BP's Rig Team


Workers Were 'at Wits End,' Say Emails Days Before Blast


Just days before the Deepwater Horizon exploded, the onshore BP PLC manager in charge of the drilling rig warned his supervisor that last-minute procedural changes were creating "chaos" on the rig.
"The operation is not going to succeed if we continue in this manner," wrote John Guide, who directed the Deepwater Horizon's operations from BP's Houston offices.
Reuters
Fire boats battled the blazing remnants of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig off Louisiana on April 21, 2010, a day after it exploded. The accident killed 11 and unleashed the worst offshore oil spill in U.S. history.
His supervisor, David Sims, told him to tell rig workers "to hang in there." Then Mr. Sims signed off to attend a dance practice, promising to call later in the day: "We're dancing to the Village People!" he wrote.
In a follow-up email that evening, Mr. Guide appeared mollified. "I totally concur," Mr. Guide wrote back. "I told them all we will work through it together. I want to do better."
Three days later, the rig blew up in the Gulf of Mexico, killing 11 workers and setting off the worst offshore oil spill in U.S. history. Investigators have cited confusion over changes at the well in the preceding weeks as a key cause of the accident.
The April 17 emails, which were given to government investigators by BP and reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, are among the most direct evidence yet that BP workers on the rig were stressed out by the numerous changes, and had voiced their concerns to BP's operations managers in Houston. That could raise further questions about whether BP managers took enough time to consider the consequences of changes they were ordering on the rig, an issue investigators say contributed to the disaster.
BP has said much of the blame for the disaster rests on its contractors, especially rig ownerTransocean Ltd. and Halliburton Co., which did cement work on the well.
In a statement Friday, BP said, "Issues addressed in the emails have been the subject of numerous investigations, and the issues discussed are not inconsistent with any published findings."
Both Transocean and Halliburton have previously defended their work on the well.
The emails focus on procedural issues and continuing alterations of plans for the Macondo well, which had proved difficult to drill for many months. They don't suggest that either Mr. Guide or Mr. Sims was concerned about an immediate safety risk.
On the morning of April 17, three days before the explosion, Mr. Guide sent the email to Mr. Sims to complain that "there has been so many last minute changes to the operation" that the rig's on-board managers had "finally come to their wits end."
"The quote is 'flying by the seat of our pants,' " Mr. Guide wrote.
Mr. Sims replied about 90 minutes later, telling Mr. Guide that the team working on the well should remain positive "until this well is over."
"It should be obvious to all that we could not plan ahead for the well conditions we're seeing, so we have to accept some level of last minute changes," he wrote to Mr. Guide.
On Friday, Mr. Guide referred calls to his lawyer, who said that his client "has done everything he could to bend over backwards to be as helpful as he can to any legitimate inquiry." Mr. Sims couldn't immediately be reached for comment. BP would not discuss whether the two men continued to hold those jobs, saying it was a personnel matter.
BP made several changes to the design of the well in the weeks leading up to the disaster, ultimately choosing an option that investigators say was riskier than other alternatives. The company also repeatedly altered its procedure for finishing up the well, which sowed confusion aboard the rig, according to subsequent testimony from workers. And a week before the explosion, BP made a series of rapid-fire changes to its drilling permit that were unusual, according to a Journal analysis of federal permit data going back to 2004.
BP has denied that its changes increased risk on the well or confused the crew.
Safety experts have long said that frequent procedural changes increase the risk of an accident, because they can create confusion and affect other operations in unintended ways.
BP had rules in place governing procedural changes, but its workers didn't consistently follow them, according to BP's September internal report on the disaster and the report released earlier this month by the presidential commission on the accident.
"Such decisions appear to have been made by the BP Macondo team in ad hoc fashion without any formal risk analysis or internal expert review," the commission's report said. "This appears to have been a key causal factor of the blowout."
Fred Bartlit, the general counsel for the presidential commission, said Mr. Guide's email "further confirms the commission's finding that BP poorly managed last-minute design and procedural changes at Macondo."
BP's internal report downplayed the significance of the decisions, saying they didn't contribute to the blowout.
BP's report did cite critical mistakes in the final hours before the rig blew on April 20 that were made by the same on-board managers that Mr. Guide said in his email were at wit's end. One of them, Robert Kaluza, later expressed confusion about the procedural changes in an interview with BP investigators after the explosion, according to notes from interviews reviewed by the Journal.
Mr. Kaluza has refused to testify before federal investigators, citing his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. His lawyer declined to comment on the emails.
In his email, Mr. Guide said the situation had gotten bad enough that one engineer on the rig, Brian Morel, was considering asking for a transfer or quitting altogether. Mr. Morel couldn't immediately be reached for comment.
"Brian has called me numerous times trying to make sense of all the insanity," Mr. Guide wrote.
Mr. Sims said Mr. Guide should remind Mr. Morel that "this is a great learning opportunity" and that, "the same issues—or worse—exist anywhere else."
Write to Ben Casselman at ben.casselman@wsj.com, Russell Gold at russell.gold@wsj.comand Stephen Power at stephen.power@wsj.com

Oil-Spill Lawyers Urge Clients to Settle


Move Would Shift Gulf Residents' Claims From Court to BP's Compensation Fund; 'Most of These People Can't Wait'


[BPFUND3]Kael Alford for The Wall Street Journal
Tacky Jack's, an Orange Beach, Ala. eatery whose owners received money from the $20 billion fund set up by BP and the Obama administration.
A group of lawyers suing BP PLC over its Gulf oil spill is moving instead to redirect dozens of its clients to make claims to the $20 billion fund set up by BP and the Obama administration.
While hundreds of people are still suing BP in federal court, the lawyers' move could end up robbing that ongoing litigation of the critical mass of plaintiffs that might be needed to prove broad economic losses.
The move by the lawyers—about 30 altogether—represents the first significant crack in plaintiffs' attorneys' plans to reap significant court victories for hundreds of people affected by the spill triggered by the April explosion that sank BP's Deepwater Horizon rig, killing 11 workers.
Those still representing clients in the federal litigation said they would continue. "It is not our job to pass judgment on how individual lawyers choose to handle their clients' claims," said Brian Barr, one of the lead attorneys in the litigation against BP.
For the fishermen, resort owners, hoteliers and others who say they were financially harmed by the Gulf disaster, settling means a quicker payout but a lost chance at earning damage payments.
Zuma Press
Tallahassee, Fla., restaurant owner Jeff Stilwel at an October meeting on the Gulf oil spill's $20 billion compensation fund.
For their attorneys, the move is a chance to eke out a bigger settlement that could serve as a lure for other plaintiffs to drop their lawsuits and hire them to settle claims.
For BP, settling all the claims could save money on attorneys' fees and usher the matter out of the public eye rather than a lawsuit that lingers for years.
A BP spokeswoman declined to comment.
The group of lawyers represent about 5,000 claims that could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, the lawyers involved said.

Editors' Deep Dive: Industry's Traditional Spill Tech Lags

Access thousands of business sources not available on the free web. Learn More
The claims would cover future losses expected to be suffered as the region reels from the spill's lingering impacts, such as tar balls that still periodically wash ashore. Almost 500,000 claims for emergency and final payments have been lodged so far with Washington, D.C., attorney Kenneth Feinberg, administrator of the $20 billion compensation fund.
The lawsuits against BP were consolidated and are being heard by U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier in New Orleans. Attorneys in the federal litigation are moving ahead, taking depositions and interviewing key witnesses in an action that could end up costing BP millions.
The federal litigation is sprawling and also includes environmental claims against BP and other defendants as well as civil racketeering and securities suits. Those branches of the litigation will proceed regardless of how many plaintiffs stick with their economic suits. Any criminal case the government may file wouldn't be affected.
The move away from the courts by the alliance of attorneys—led by Daniel Becnel in Louisiana—represents a new tactic for lawyers who weren't named to lead the federal litigation and so are ineligible to reap the biggest fees.
Last week, over dinner at a resort hotel in Florida, Mr. Becnel and two other Louisiana attorneys, Camilo Salas and J.R. Whaley, hammered out a plan to proceed with settling by the end of February the claims of their clients and others represented by different attorneys in the coalition.
Still other attorneys, including those who represent families of some of those killed or injured in the rig explosion, are in similar negotiations with Mr. Feinberg, according to several people familiar with the situation.
Plaintiffs face a dilemma: fight in court and potentially reap big rewards, or turn to the fund and get a faster payout for their past and likely future losses but forgo any damage payments.
Anyone who reaches a final settlement with Mr. Feinberg must waive their right to sue BP and other defendants. "Most of these people can't wait," said Mr. Becnel. "They don't have the financial wherewithal."
New Orleans attorney Stuart Smith said he advised his clients, among them hoteliers, restaurant owners and fishermen, to drop their suits so he could negotiate with Mr. Feinberg "in good faith." He filed motions to dismiss the suits last month.
Mr. Smith, who is part of the group that is aligning with Mr. Becnel, said other plaintiffs could bail on the federal litigation if the group's settlement talks are successful.
The attorneys brokering the settlements are charging clients roughly 12.5% of their total haul, compared with as much as 40% lawyers might reap in court victories.
The raft of claims being presented to Mr. Feinberg also includes people who haven't sued but might turn to the court if unhappy with their final offer from him.
Mr. Feinberg, who served previously as special master of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, has been touring Gulf states trying to draw as many people as he can to the fund.
He instituted a plan last month to fast track final payments for some applicants by cutting down on red tape and allowing those who already received emergency payments to receive final, lump-sum payments of either $25,000 for businesses or $5,000 for individuals.
As of Wednesday, Mr. Feinberg had paid 168,502 claims altogether for a total of $3.35 billion. He will release the general methodology he plans to use to calculate final settlements next week.
Since Mr. Feinberg started his campaign, plaintiffs' attorneys who are leading the federal lawsuits have worried that the fund, which can be accessed without hiring an attorney, would decimate attempts to sue BP if potential clients filed claims.
The settlement talks also signal a rift among plaintiffs' attorneys handling oil cases.
Those who were upset that they weren't chosen as members of a committee to lead the litigation are more inclined to now turn to the Feinberg fund, as it gives them an alternative not offered in most mass torts."At the end of the day I think lawyers should be focusing on their individual clients, and I'm going to connect the dots the most fair way possible," said Louisiana attorney Richard J. Arsenault who is taking his clients' claims to Mr. Feinberg. "Justice delayed is justice denied."
Write to Dionne Searcey at dionne.searcey@wsj.com